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The Unconstitutionality of
Electing State Judges
Monroe H. Freedman,
Professor of Law,
Hofstra University Law School

Abstract:
There is reason to believe that a majority of five justices can be persuaded to hold
that the practice or electing judges, and, particularly, of re-electing judges, violates
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.
Rezumat:
Existi motive s& credem ca majoritatea de cincijudeca-tori ai Curtii Supreme poate
fi convins& pentru a considera ca practica de alegere, si, Tn special, de realegere a
judeca-torilor, Tncalca Clauza procesului echitabil din Constitutie.
Keywords: election, judges
In Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White 95 the Supreme Court held that a
candidate in a judicial election has a First
Amendment right to announce his or her
views on disputed legal or political issues.
Accordingly, the Court struck down the
"announce" clause of the ABA Model
Code of Judicial Conduct (1972), which
had forbidden a judicial candidate to
announce such views. 96 The majority
opinion was written by Justice Scalia,
joined by Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy,
and Thomas. The dissenters were
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
Even more important than the holding
in Republican Party of Minnesota
regarding the announce clause, however,
is the opinion expressed in strong and
extensive dicta by a majority of the Court,
952536 U.S. 765, 122 S.Ct. 2528 (2002).
96 "(1) A candidate, including an incumbent
judge, for a judicial office ... (b) should not ...

announce his views on disputed legal or political
issues...." ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct,
Canon 7B(l)(b) (1972).

stating that due
process is violated whenever
a judge who is
subject to reelection decides a
controversial

case. That conclusion
was
expressed by
Justice

Gins-

burg, writing for
the four dissenting Justices, and by Justice O'Connor,
who parted from the majority to write a
separate opinion addressing that issue.
Beginning in 1927, in Tumey v. Ohio 97,
the Supreme Court recognized in an
opinion by Chief Justice Taft that due
97 273 U.S. 510, 3 47 S.Ct. 437 (1927). See
also In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955);
Commonwealth Coatings v. Continental Casualty
Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968); Ward v. Village of
Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 93 S.Ct. 80 (1972);
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process is denied if there is a "possible
temptation to the average ... judge ...
which might lead him not to hold the
balance nice, clear, and true...."98 Tumey
was a misdemeanor prosecution in which
the judge received $12 as his share of
the $100 penalty assessed against the
defendant. In vacating the conviction for
violating due process, the Court held that
unless the judge's interest is so "remote,
trifling, or insignificant," as to be de
minimis, the judge must be disqualified. 99
Based on the Tumey line of authority,
Justice Ginsburg concluded that a litigant
is deprived of due process when the judge
who hears his case has a "direct,
personal, substantial and pecuniary"
interest in ruling against him100 ; that the
judge's interest issufficiently "direct" if the
judge knows that her "tenure in office
depend[s] on certain outcomes;" 101 and
that due process does not require a

98 273 U.S. at 532, 47 S.Ct. at 444 (emphasis
added).
99 Id. at 531-5 532 and 444. In Ward v. Village
of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 93 S.Ct. 80 (1972),
the Court vacated a traffic conviction on due process
grounds. There, the mayor who acted as judge
received no share in the petitioner's fines of $100,
but such fines were a substantial part of the village's
revenues. Under state law, petitioner could have
had a trial de novo before a judge, but the Supreme
Court held that due process entitled him to a "neutral
and detached judge in the first instance." 409 U.S.
at 62, 93 S.Ct. at 84.
100Quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475
U.S. at 824.
101Citing Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60.
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showing that the judge is biased in fact
as a result of her self-interest. Rather, the
Court's due process decisions have
"always endeavored to prevent even the
probability of unfairness."1 02 Ginsburg's
remarks are applicable to any judge who
"may be voted off the bench and thereby
lose her salary and emoluments" if her
decision displeases the voters. 10 3
In her separate opinion, Justice
O'Connor agreed that judges who are
subject to reelection "cannot help being
aware that if the public is not satisfied with
the outcome of a particular case, it could
hurt their reelection prospects," 10 4 giving
them "at least some personal stake in the
outcome of every publicized case."l 0 5
O'Connor approvingly cited the observation of a state supreme court judge who
said that ignoring the political consequences of controversial cases is like
"ignoring a crocodile in your bathtub." 1 0 6
She also relied on studies showing that
judges who face elections are far more
likely to override jury sentences of life
without parole and impose the death

penalty. 10 7
O'Connor's opinion then went further,
to challenge "judicial elections generally,"108 regardless of whether a particular
case might be affected by the judge's
concern about reelection. Referring to the
102

Quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133,136.
122 S.Ct. at 2556.

103536 U.S. at 816,
104Id. at 789, 2543.
105 Id.

at 788-789, 2543.
Eule, Crocodiles in the Bathtup: State Courts,
Voter Initiatives and the Threat of Electoral Reprisal,
65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 733, 739 (1994).
107Bright and Keenan, Judges and the Politics
of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and
the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U.L. Rev.
759, 793-794 (1995). See also Ronald J. Tabak,
Why an Independent Appointing Authority is
Necessary to Choose Counsel for Indigent People
in Capital Punishment Cases, 31 Hofstra L. Rev.
1105, 1106-1108 (2003).
108Id. at 788, 2542.
106

state's claim of a compelling interest in
"an actual and perceived ... impartial
judiciary," she noted that "the very
practice of electing judges undermines
this interest." 109 That is,even when judges
succeed in overcoming their concern with
voters' displeasure, the public's
confidence in the judiciary could be
undermined "simply by the possibility" that
judges would be unable to do so. 110
Inaddition, O'Connor noted the pernicious effects of campaign fund-raising in
judicial elections.' Not surprisingly,
lawyers and litigants who appear in court
are among the major contributors to
judges' campaigns1 1 2 , and "relying on
campaign donations may leave judges
feeling indebted to certain parties or

interest groups." 11 3

When lawyers and litigants appear to
be buying influence with campaign
contributions, the appearance of partiality
goes beyond the highly publicized case,
tainting any case in which money may
have passed to a judge's campaign by a

109Id. (Emphasis added).
110 Id.

111 Id. at 7 17 89-790, citing Schotland,
Financing judicial Elections, 2000: Change and
Challenge, 2001 L. Rev. Mich. State U. Detroit
College of law 849, 866 (reporting that in 2000, the
13 candidates in a partisan election for five seates
on the Alabama Supreme court spent an average
of $1,092,076 on their campaigns); American Bar
Association, Report and Recommendaitons of the
Task Force on Lawyers' Political Contributions, Pt.
2 (July, 1998)(reporting that in 1995, one candidate
for the Pennsylvania Supreme court raised
$1,848,142 in campaign funds, and that in 1986,
$2,700,000 was spent on the race for Chief Justice
of the Ohio Supreme Court).
112Id. at 790, citing Barnhizer, "On the Make":
Campaign Funding and the Corrupting of the
American Judiciary, 50 Cath. U.L. Rev. 361 (2001);
Thomas, National L.J., March 16, 1998, p.A8, col.
1; Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, Inc., and
American Viewpoint, National Public Opin. Survey
Frequency Questionnaire 4 (2001) (http://
www.j usti ceatstake . org/fi les/
JASNationalSurveyResults.pdf) (indicating that 76
percent of registered voters believe that campaign

litigant or lawyer in a case.1 14 Thus,
O'Connor's ultimate due process
challenge is to the entire system of judicial
election of judges, in cases of both major
and minor public interest.
The five Justices in Republican Party
of Minnesota who condemned judicial
retention elections on due process
grounds wereechoing the view expressed
by Alexander Hamilton in THE
FEDERALIST No. 78.115 Hamilton
explained that fidelity to the Constitution
and laws, and to the rights of individuals
is "indispensable" in the courts of
justice." 1 1 6 He cautioned, however, that
indispensable fidelity cannot be expected
from judges who hold their offices subject
to reelection.1 17 Regardless of who might
exercise the power of retention, Hamilton
wrote, the judges' fear of displeasing that
authority would be "fatal to their necessary
independence."1 18 Specifically, if the
power of retention were to reside in the
people, or to persons chosen by them for
that purpose, "there would be too great a

contributions influence judicial decisions).
113 Id.
114 Id.

115 Hamilton wrote: That inflexible and uniform
adherence to the rights of the constitution and of
individuals, which we perceive to be indispensable
in the courts of justice, can certainly not be expected
from judges who hold their offices [subject to
reelection]. Periodical appointments, however
regulated, or by whomsoever made, would in some
way or other be fatal to their necessary
independence. If the power of making them was
committed either to the executive or legislature,
there would be danger of an improper complaisance
to the branch which possessed it; if to both, there
would be anunwillingness to hazard the displeasure
of either; if to the people, or to persons chosen by
them for the special purpose, there would be too
great a disposition to consult popularity [rather than
assuring] that nothing would be consulted but the
constitution and the laws. Alexander Hamilton,
James Madison, John Jay, THE FEDERALIST, No.
78, p. 417 (ed., J.R. Pole) (2005).
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
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disposition to consult popularity" rather response in view of Brown v. Board of
than assuring that "nothing would be Education of Topeka 2 7 (invalidating de
consulted but the constitution and the jure school segregation under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
laws." 119
Hamilton's concerns were illustrated Amendment) and, particularly, Bolling v.
by the case of Tennessee Supreme Court Sharpel 2 8 (reaching the same result
Justice Penny White. In 1996, her under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
retention was defeated by a campaign Amendment). Moreover, the Supreme
that relied upon her vote against the death Court held in 1991 that if a trial judge is
penalty in a case in which she (and four not impartial, there is a "structural defect"
other justices) had affirmed the in the trial, and reversal is required without
defendant's conviction. That outcome was consideration of the harmless error
"twisted in inflammatory mass doctrine.129 Indeed, because the right to
mailings," 1 2 0 which denounced Justice an impartial tribunal is essential to
White as wanting to "free more and more fundamental fairness, it is one of those
criminals and laugh at their victims." 12 1 "extraordinary" rights that cannot be
After Justice White's loss, Tennessee waived. 130
In addition, a significant part of Justice
Governor Don Sundquist asked, "Should
a judge look over his shoulder about O'Connor's concern is the advent of
whether they're [sic] going to be thrown fund-raising in judicial elections in
out of office?" 1 2 2 He answered his own exorbitant amounts, reaching into millions
question, "Ihope so." 1 23 Justice Ginsburg of dollars. 13 1 As Ohio Supreme Court
referred to THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78124 Justice Paul Pfeifer has said, "Inever felt
and 79125 in her opinion (although not to so much like a hooker down by thebus
the passage quoted above). That may be station as I did in a judicial election." 1 3 2
Multi-million dollar fund-raising
the reason that Justice Scalia made the
point that popular election of judges has profoundly undermines judicial independence and impartiality. In the
coexisted with the Fourteenth Amendment since its adoption.126 However, that millennia-old epigram, "Gifts are like
would not seem to be an adequate hooks" 13 3 - or, in modern parlance, gifts
119 Id.

120 Weiss, Tough on Crime: How Campaigns
for State Judiciary Violate Criminal Defendants' Due
Process Rights, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1101, 1104
(2006).
121 Id., citing Bright, Political Attacks on the
Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done Amid Efforts to
Intimidate and Remove Judges from Office for
Unpopular Decisions?, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 308 app.
A at 332 (reprinting mass mailing).
122 Id., citing Wade, White's Defeat Poses Legal
Dilemma: How Is a Replacement Justice Picked?,
Com.12Appeal
(Memphis, Tenn.), Aug. 3,1996, at Al.
3
Id.
124 536 U.S. 765, 803, 804.
125
Id. at 817.
126 Id. at 783.
127 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
128 74 S.Ct. 693 (1954).
129 Arizona v.Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. 1246,1265
(1991).
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130 United States v. Fay, 300 F.3d 345, 350-351
(2d Cir., 1962).
131536 U.S. at 789-790, citing Schotland,
Financing judicial Elections, 2000: Change and
Challenge, 2001 L. Rev. Mich. State U. Detroit
College of law 849, 866 (reporting that in 2000, the
13 candidates in a partisan election for five seates
on the Alabama Supreme court spent an average
of $1,092,076 on their campaigns); American Bar
Association, Report and Recommendaitons of the
Task Force on Lawyers' Political Contributions, Pt.
2 (July, 1998) (reporting that in 1995, one candidate
for the Pennsylvania Supreme court raised
$1,848,142 in campaign funds, and that in 1986,
$2,700,000 was spent on the race for Chief Justice
of the Ohio Supreme Court).
132 Adam Liptak and Janet Roberts, Campaign
Cash Mirrors a High Court's Rulings, The N.Y.
Times, Oct. 1, 2006.
133 Attributed to Marcus Valerius Martialis (40

AD - 103 AD).

are chits or counters. Moreover,
fund-raising forjudicial office did not exist
in 1789 or in 1868. Thus, the factual
premise for a due process attack on
elected judges is significantly different
from the circumstances at the time of the
adoption of either the Fifth or the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Furthermore, negative campaigning
against sitting judges by single-interest
political-action organizations is a relatively
recent phenomenon. This is illustrated in
Utah, where judges have been voted off
the bench in retention elections after
vociferous opposition by such disparate
groups as the Gun Owners of Utah, 134 the
National Organization of Women, 135 and
the Gay and Lesbian Utah Democrats, 13 6
and by a coalition group organized by the
pastor of the First Baptist Church of
Tooele and calling itself Utahns for

Judicial Reform. 13 7
One tactic of these groups (and even
of contending judicial candidates
themselves) is to focus on a sensationalized or distorted version of the
underlying facts of a case, while ignoring
controlling legal issues, and then, in
effect, to identify the judge with the
criminal and/or the crime. This is
illustrated by former Judge Penny White's
case, discussed above, where Judge
White was characterized as wanting to
"free more and more criminals and laugh
at their victims." 1 38 In that case, Judge
White had not voted to free the appellant,
who had been sentenced to death.
Rather, she had concurred in a majority

134
135

The Salt Lake Tribune (Nov. 8, 2006).
Id. (Oct. 27, 2002).

136

Id.

137

Id.The group is concerned with what it views
as leniency with sex offenders and drunk drivers.
Regarding criticism that a judge had been unduly
lenient in a case of sex abuse of a twelve-yearold
girl, the Deputy Tooele County Attorney wrote a
lengthy letter defending the judge's sentence.
138 Id., citing Bright, Political Attacks on the

opinion affirming the conviction and
remanding the case for re-sentencing.
Since Republican Party of Minnesota
was decided, Rehnquist and O'Connor
have been replaced on the Court by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. Ifeither
of them adopts Justice O'Connor's views,
there would still be a majority in favor of
invalidating judicial elections on due
process grounds. Moreover, it appears
that Justice Kennedy could be persuaded
to adopt that position. It is true that he did
not refer to due process in the Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White, but there he
joined an opinion based on the First
Amendment, which made it unnecessary
to reach the Due Process Clause.
However, Justice Kennedy has
demonstrated a particularly strong concern with the appearance of impartiality.
For example, he joined the majority
opinion in Liljeberg v. Health Services
Acquisition Corp.,139 in which the Court
quoted from an opinion by Justice
Frankfurter. Explaining why he was
recusing himself from a case, Frankfurter
said: "The guiding consideration is that
the administration of justice should
reasonably appear to be disinterested as
well as be so in fact." 14 0
Inthat case, Justice Frankfurter did not
base his recusal on the Due Process
Clause, but on what "[t]he judicial process
demands."1 4 1 However, Justice Kennedy,
in his concurrence in Liteky v. U.S.,142
relied on cases involving due process in
explaining that "In matters of ethics,
appearance and reality often converge as

Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done Amid Efforts to
Intimidate and Remove Judges from Office for
Unpopular Decisions?, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 308 app.
A at 332 (reprinting mass mailing).
139486 U.S. 847 (1988).

140 Id. at 869, quoting Public Utilities Comm'n
of D.C. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 466-467, 72 S.Ct.
813, 822-823 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., inchambers).
141343 U.S. at 466, 72 S.Ct. At 822.
142 510 U.S. 540 (1994).
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one," 14 3 and in referring to the importance
of "the appearance of fairness and

neutrality." 14 4
Thereafter, in Caperton v.A. T.Massey
Coal Co., Inc.,145 Kennedy explained for

the Court that "the Due Process Clause
has been implemented by objective
standards that do not require proof of
actual bias." 14 6 He added that the Court
elaborated its concern with conflicts
resulting from financial incentives in Ward
v. Monroeville, 1 4 7 where, "unlike in
Tumey, the mayor received no money;
instead the fines the mayor assessed
went to the town's general fisc." 14 8 The
principle requiring reversal on due
process grounds, he said, "turned on the
'possible temptation' the mayor might

143 Id. at 565, citing Offutt v. United States, 348
U.S. 11,14,75 S.Ct. 11,13-14, 99 L.Ed. 11 (1954)
("[J]ustice must satisfy the appearance of justice").
144 Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242,
100 S.Ct. 1610, 1613, 64 L.Ed.2d 182 (1980) (noting
the importance of "preserv[ing] both the appearance
and reality of fairness," which "'generat[es] the
feeling, so important to a popular government, that
justice has been done' ") (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 172, 71 S.Ct. 624, 649, 95 L.Ed. 817
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
145 129 S.Ct. 2252 (2009).
146 Id. at 2263, citing inter alia Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927). At the oral argument in
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face" because of his executive responsibilities of village finances. 14 9 Kennedy
added that the Court had reiterated in yet
another case that "the [judge's] financial
stake need not be as direct or positive as
it appeared to be in Tumey."150
There is reason to believe, therefore,
that a majority of five justices can be
persuaded to hold that the practice of
electing judges, and, particularly, of
re-electing judges, violates the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution.
Nota redactiei: Articolul a fost publicat
initial in Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics,
Vol. 26, Issue 1, Revista Forumul Judec5torilor primind permisiunea autorului si a

revistei americane in vederea republicarii
exclusive a studiului in Romania.

Caperton, "When Massey's counsel argued ... that

Due Process cannot rest on appearances, Justice
Kennedy replied: 'But our whole system is designed
to ensure confidence in our judgments.... And it ...
seems to me litigants have an entitlement to that
under the Due Process Clause."' Caperton
Transcript, quoted in James Sample, Democracy
at the Corner of First and Fourteenth: Judicial
Campaign Spending and Equality, 66 NYU Annual
Survey of American Law 727, 770 (2011).
147 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
148 Caperton at 2260.
149

Id.

1o Id., citing Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564,
579 (1973).

